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INTERNET JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES:




A World Wide Web site posted by the Attorney General of Minne-
sota reads: "Warning to all Internet Users and Providers: Persons
outside of Minnesota who transmit information via the Internet know-
ing that information will be disseminated in Minnesota are subject to
jurisdiction in Minnesota courts for violations of state criminal and
civil laws."' As this posting indicates, the technological developments
of the Internet have presented the judicial system with new, almost
inconceivable, issues dealing with in personam jurisdiction. Because
of the burgeoning capabilities of computers, traditional jurisdictional
boundaries have required re-examination.
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 in personam jurisdiction has been
predicated on the standard of a presence in the state - whether the
presence be of the actual person, or of continuous, ongoing, and tangi-
ble contacts with the state.3 With the advent of computer technology,
the definition of presence has been radically altered. Computer sig-
nals transmitted via phone line enable parties to have "virtual" pres-
ence anywhere their signal is received. This enables business deals to
be negotiated without physical presence, or, in some cases, a tangible
medium of transaction other than a computer database.4 Addition-
ally, crimes and torts have the potential of being committed without
perpetrators ever doing more than logging on to their computers. 5
t Assistant Director of Legal Writing, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
tt Associate, Chattman, Gaines & Stern, L.P.A. Mr. Reber was a member of the
Cleveland-Marshall moot court team that won best Petitioner's brief and best overall
team at the 1995 John Marshall College of Law Information Technology and Privacy
Competition. It was upon the problem in that competition that this Article is based.
1. Mac Norton, Speedtrap, Roadblocks, and Sobriety Checks on the Information
Superhighway, 30 ARK. LAw. 7, 7 (1996).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Pre-
cedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197, 199 (1995).
4. John W. Verity & Robert D. Hof, The Internet: How It Will Change the Way
You Do Business, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 14, 1994, at 80.
5. See, e.g., Colin Poitras, Trying to Find Him at Ripoff@Internet.Com, HARTFORD
CouRANr, Dec. 28, 1995, at A; Bruce Haring, Giving Chase in Cyberspace to Catch a
Hacker, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 1996, at 4D.
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These technological developments have the potential of causing
innumerable horrors when construing "fundamental fairness" princi-
ples associated with conferring jurisdiction on a particular forum. If
the concept of fairness of jurisdiction is related to a person's contacts
with, and anticipation of, litigation in a particular state, there is a
potential clash with the physical world when electronics enable a per-
son to achieve a presence in all fifty states (or even the entire world)
almost immediately from anywhere there might be a modem hook-up.
This Article explains Internet jurisdictional issues within the cur-
rent framework that enables a state to assert in personam jurisdic-
tion. This Article argues that existing jurisdictional tests are
appropriate in determining the fairness of jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing the Internet, despite the vast outreach capacity of computers.
This Article will first examine the development of law concerning in
personam jurisdiction. Next, this Article will reflect on how courts
have handled jurisdictional issues respecting other modes of commu-
nication, namely the mail and telephone. Third, this Article will ar-
gue that in traditional jurisdictional analysis, courts have placed
primary emphasis on business contacts and purposeful conduct prior
to asserting that a "minimum contact" standard has been met and
that Internet bulletin board postings, alone, rarely fit into these cate-
gories. Finally, this Article will conclude by asserting that current ju-
risdictional standards can easily be applied to situations in which the
contact point between states is an Internet transaction and that it is
not necessary to redevelop jurisdictional tests to accommodate com-
puter technology.
JURISDICTIONAL HISTORY
The United States Supreme Court has established modern per-
sonal jurisdiction law in four primary decisions. 6 The first of these
decisions, and setting the standard for most "long-arm" jurisprudence,
was International Shoe Co. v. Washington.7 In International Shoe, the
6. Prior to what would be considered "modern personal jurisdiction law," the
United States Supreme Court decided several jurisdictional issues that left "long-arm"
jurisdiction in a somewhat uncertain state because of the need to switch from a theory
where physical presence was required to one which accounted for mobility and virtual
presence (such as a corporate entity). The first Supreme Court case that really dealt
with the realities of travel and temporary presence within a state validated a Massa-
chusetts statute that allowed Massachusetts to assert jurisdiction over a cause of action
arising when a nonresident operated his motor vehicle in the state. Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927).
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The International Shoe Company was a Delaware Corpo-
ration doing business primarily in Missouri but employing sales representatives in
Washington. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945). The
State of Washington sued International Shoe in an attempt to recover payments due to
the unemployment compensation fund. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311-12. The
1170 [Vol. 30
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Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction need not be predicated
on physical presence in a state, but may be constitutionally exercised
if a nonresident defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum
state.8 The Court determined that such contacts must be determined
by the relationship between the defendant and the forum state and in
light of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."9 In
defining "fair play and substantial justice," the Court established that
fairness emanates from purposeful activities directed at a forum state
that result in a person's (or business') gaining the benefit and protec-
tion of a forum state's laws. 10
The Supreme Court has furthered the "presence" notion since In-
ternational Shoe. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,"
the Court ruled that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a corpora-
tion having physical presence in the state even though the subject of
litigation occurred elsewhere. 12 The defendant in Perkins was a Phil-
ippine corporation that, prior to World War II, had its principal place
of business in the Philippines. 13 During the Second World War, the
corporation's president returned to his home state of Ohio, and carried
on parts of the corporation's business. 14 The corporation was sued in
Ohio for shareholder earnings that were accumulated while the com-
pany had done business in the Philippines. 15 The Supreme Court
found that Ohio was an appropriate forum for litigation because of the
corporation's contact with, and presence in, the state. 16 This was true
even though the plaintiff was not even a resident of Ohio.17
The Court continued to address the establishment of personal ju-
risdiction boundaries. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 1
the Court held that a single contact, if commercial in nature, could
meet the "minimum contacts/fundamental fairness" test.19 In McGee,
the defendant, an Arizona corporation, renewed an insurance policy
written for a California resident.20 The defendant had neither an of-
State perfected service by serving a sales representative and sending notice by regis-
tered mail to the home office. Id. at 320.
8. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 319. The Court ultimately held that International Shoe enjoyed the
"privilege of conducting activities" with the state and thus enjoyed "the benefits and
protection of the laws" of the state. Id.
11. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
12. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952).
13. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447.
14. Id. at 447-48.
15. Id. at 448-39.
16. Id. at 447-48.
17. Id. at 438.
18. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
19. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
20. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221.
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fice nor an agent in California and had no other contact with the state
aside from the renewal of that one policy. 21 Nevertheless, the Court
found jurisdiction appropriate on the basis that selling even one insur-
ance policy in California created "a contract which had substantial
connection" with California for jurisdictional purposes.
22
Finally, in Hanson v. Denckla,23 the Supreme Court refined the
minimum contacts test by providing two guidelines to help in the
test's application. First, the Court stated that the "unilateral activity
of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant
cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."
2 4
Second, the Court determined that exercise of personal jurisdiction re-
quires that the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State."2 5 This, the Court rea-
soned, meant that the defendant invoked the "benefits and protection"
of the forum state's laws which, in turn, would result in a reasonable
expectation of litigation in that forum.
2 6
After Hanson, the evolution of personal jurisdictional standards
was, for a time, confined to lower courts. 27 From the lower court deci-
sions emerged two characterizations of personal jurisdiction - gen-
eral and specific jurisdiction.28 General jurisdiction may be asserted
over a defendant if the defendant's contacts with the forum state are
systematic and continuous.2 9 This theory confers jurisdiction over de-
fendants who do not necessarily commit a tort within the forum state,
but have regular contacts, such as business dealings, within the
state.3 0 Specific jurisdiction generally applies to individuals who com-
mit torts in forum states or to individual transactions that occur in a
particular state. Such jurisdiction exists over a defendant if
(1) [the defendant] has contacts with the forum state that
which are related to the cause of action, (2) those contacts
amount to purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, and (3) the exercise ofjuris-
21. Id. at 222.
22. Id. at 223.
23. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
24. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Hanson, a woman executed a
trust agreement in Delaware with a Delaware bank being trustee. Hanson, 357 U.S. at
239. After the woman moved to Florida and passed away there, legatees in Florida
brought suit attempting to settle issues related to the disbursement of the trust. Id. at
239-40.
25. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
26. Id.
27. Flavio Rose, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The "But For" Test,
82 CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1549 (1994).
28. Rose, 82 CAL. L. REV. at 1549.
29. Id. See, e.g., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18.
30. See, e.g., Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 1458, 1470-
71 (D. Del. 1991).
1172 [Vol. 30
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diction appears reasonable to the court based on a weighing
of factors similar to those used by federal courts in deciding
forum nonconveniens motions.
31
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,3 2 the crite-
ria for specific jurisdiction was adopted by the Supreme Court. Fur-
thermore, in Burger King v. Rudzewicz,33 the Court gave more insight
into how the specific jurisdiction test should be applied. The Court
stated that minimum contacts are met only where an alleged injury
arises out of or relates to action by the defendant that are purposefully
directed toward forum residents.34 The Court emphasized that the
analysis, similar to previous Supreme Court cases, remained whether
the defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts."35 The
Court made it clear that the "'purposeful availment' requirement en-
sure[d] that a defendant would not be hauled into a jurisdiction solely
as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts."36 Several
factors were suggested as important to analyzing the fairness of as-
serting jurisdiction:
[1.] the burden on the defendant,
[2.] the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
[3.] the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effec-
tive relief,
[4.1 the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies, and
[5.] the shared interests of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies. 37
The numerous jurisdictional tests and considerations postulated
by the Supreme Court and other lower courts have all been aimed at
defining what is a "minimum contact" that enables jurisdiction to be
fair. State "long-arm" statutes are, in many ways, a codification of
fairness standards articulated by International Shoe and its prog-
eny.38 These statutes have developed to include such provisions as
asserting jurisdiction over those conducting continuous business in
31. Rose, 82 CAL. L. REv. at 1549.
32. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
33. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
34. Burger King v. Rudzwicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). The Court reasoned that a
state has an interest in ensuring state residents have a convenient forum to redressing
injuries caused by non-resident actors. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.
35. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
36. Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 476-77.
38. For a discussion of the development of long-arm statutes, see Comment, Devel-
opments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 1000-06 (1960)
(hereinafter "Developments"). For a discussion of long-arm statutes pre and post Inter-
national Shoe, see David P. Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Ex-
tended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 537 (1963).
1997] 1173
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the state, those committing torts in the state, and those committing
torts outside the state that have an effect within the state.39
Even given the attempts of "long-arm" statutes to fall in line with
United States Supreme Court mandates, non-residents sued in foreign
states have still consistently challenged asserted jurisdiction as "fun-
damentally unfair" and unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause.40 Courts dealing with these challenges have applied jurisdic-
tional ideology in various, sometimes confusing, ways. Some courts
have interpreted their state long-arm statutes as conferring jurisdic-
tion to the maximum extent allowed under the Due Process Clause,
still finding, however, that jurisdiction had the potential of being un-
constitutionally asserted. 41 Some state courts have interpreted their
long-arm statutes as defining the constitutional minimum contacts re-
quired by International Shoe, thus holding their state long-arm stat-
utes to be merely a codification of due process mandates and not
requiring additional analysis.42 Still others courts have interpreted
their long-arm statutes as "conferring jurisdiction to the maximum ex-
tent allowed under the Due Process Clause" but still requiring a sec-
ondary assessment as to whether jurisdiction was fundamentally fair
based on sufficient contacts with the state.43
If jurisdictional interpretation was not confusing enough, many of
these latter courts convoluted the matter further by referring to the
second prong of jurisdictional analysis as examining a defendant's
"minimum contacts" with a state.44 Under this interpretation, in or-
39. The latter two "long-arm" criteria stem from the decision of Hess v. Pawlowski,
in which the Supreme Court validated that a single tortious act committed within a
state could confer jurisdiction on that state. Hess, 274 U.S. at 356-57. The law devel-
oped from one in which the act was necessarily committed in the state to one in which
effect in the state was sufficient. See generally Development, 73 HARv. L. REV. at 1002-
06.
40. See, e.g., Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 96 S.E.2d 445, 454-55 (N.C.
1957) (holding that a North Carolina "long-arm" provision was unconstitutional as ap-
plied to a nonresident publisher whose only contact with the state was shipping
magazines into the state).
41. See, e.g., Knight v. San Jacinto Club, Inc., 232 A.2d 462, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1967). Other states have used this means of interpretation but held that, as
applied to particular litigants, the statute exceeded due process limitations. See, e.g.,
Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223
(Tex. 1991).
42. See, e.g., Kilcrease v. Butler, 739 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ark. 1987); Mohler v. Do-
rado Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Houston, 600 P.2d
886, 890 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); Mahnkey v. King, 489 P.2d 361, 363 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
43. See, e.g., Chittendon Trust Co. v. LaChance, 464 F. Supp. 446, 447 (D. Vt.
1978); School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 433 (W.D. Mo. 1978),
appeal dismissed by 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus.
Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506, 513-14 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Markham v. Gray, 393 F. Supp. 163,
165-66 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
44. See, e.g., Glidewell Motors, Inc. v. Pate, 577 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Okla. 1978)(stat-
ing "[W]e have held the Oklahoma long-arm statutes intended to allow the reach of
1174 [Vol. 30
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der for a state to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident, the state not
only had to establish "minimum contacts" in conjunction with the
state's long-arm statute, but also examine whether "minimum con-
tacts" were sufficient so that the assertion of jurisdiction was "funda-
mentally fair" and not violative of the Due Process Clause.
45
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,46 the United States
Supreme Court engaged in a two-tiered analysis of personal jurisdic-
tion. In World-Wide, a couple from New York purchased a car, in New
York, from a New York dealership. 47 While driving to Arizona, the
couple was in an accident in Oklahoma.48 The couple filed suit in an
Oklahoma court against the manufacturer, the importer, and the re-
gional and local automobile dealerships from New York.49 They al-
leged jurisdiction based on a long-arm provision allowing jurisdiction
over torts committed outside the state having an effect within the
state.50 In finding that Oklahoma retained no jurisdiction over the
regional and local dealers, the Court noted that the New York defend-
ants sold cars only in New York and the regional district, which lim-
ited sales to a three state area. 51 Since no income was derived from
Oklahoma, the Court found no purposeful availment of the laws of
Oklahoma.5 2 Consequently, jurisdiction was found inappropriate as
violative of the Due Process Clause.
53
Despite any terms a court might be inclined to use when inter-
preting whether jurisdiction has been appropriately asserted, the
standard, no different than what was required by International Shoe,
remains whether the assertion of jurisdiction would be fundamentally
fair.54 This, in turn, hinges on sufficient contacts with a state that
personal jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts to the outer limits permitted by the due
process clause of the ... Constitution .... We define those outer limits with reference
to the rule of minimum contacts with this state by the person over whom jurisdiction is
sought.").
45. Id.; see also Kaplan School Supply Corp. v. Henry Worst, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 607,
609 (N.C. App.), review denied, 294 S.E.2d 209 (N.C. 1982). Some courts use a two-
tiered analysis absent the confusing terminology by simply stating that the court must
have jurisdiction under the long-arm statute and the exercise of jurisdiction must not
violate the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Williams v. Institute for Computational Stud-
ies at Colorado State Univ., 355 S.E.2d 177, 179 (N.C. App. 1987).
46. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
47. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
48. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 289-90.
51. Id. at 298.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 299. In a similar two-tiered analysis, the Supreme Court in Burger King
found Florida jurisdiction appropriate over a Michigan franchise. Burger King, 471 U.S.
49-71.
54. The Court in World Wide Volkswagen describes the inquiry in terms of reason-
ableness, fairness and what "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
1997] 1175
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make litigation reasonably anticipated. 55 Thus despite the enactment
of long-arm statutes and clarifications of standards, the resolution of
jurisdictional issues is still determined on a case-by-case basis with
many variables being considered. 56
The history of jurisdictional constraints and subsequent modifica-
tions is intertwined with the history of mobility in this country.
57 It
would be easy to assess as unfair the assertion of jurisdiction over a
person who owned no business in a state, owned no property in a state
and had never set foot in a state, especially if this were the late nine-
teenth century and it was a California resident attempting to assert
jurisdiction over a New York resident. At that time, mobility was lim-
ited, not just in terms of traveling from state-to-state, but mobility via
any form of modern day mass communications. "Fairness," in many
respects is much more difficult to assess now, both because of actual
physical mobility and because there are now so many more means to
communicate and conduct business. However, despite increasing mo-
bility and developing communications, the groundwork laid by the
Supreme Court in their jurisdiction cases has been appropriate when
addressing jurisdictional issues related to the technological develop-
ments in communications.
Jurisdictional analysis with respect to two media of communica-
tions-mail and telephones-is especially analogous when assessing
potential issues related to jurisdiction over Internet postings. Mail
and telephones are very much like the Internet because they have en-
abled people to cross state lines without the person's physical pres-
ence. In determining whether mailings or phone contacts have
conferred jurisdiction on a particular forum, state and lower federal
courts have applied the same balancing test articulated by the
Supreme Court, focusing on whether jurisdiction would be fundamen-
tally fair given all the circumstances of a particular situation."8
To that end, one of the primary factors considered by courts in
assessing the overall fairness of jurisdiction has been whether the con-
tact with the forum state has been of a business or of a personal, iso-
lated nature. For the most part, courts treat business contacts with a
stantial justice." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (quoting International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316, and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
55. Reasonable anticipation is often assumed when a defendant purposely directs
activities at the forum state. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
781 (1984).
56. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
57. See generally Developments, 73 HARv. L. REv. at 917-18.
58. See infra notes 60, 61, 64, 72, 92 and accompanying text.
1176 [Vol. 30
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state differently than personal, non-business contacts.59 With respect
to mail, a company or person conducting business in a state, even if it
would only be by post, might very well be deriving "benefits and pro-
tections" of a particular state's laws by virtue of the profitability (or
even lack of profitability) of the business. This, in turn, would trigger
a "reasonable anticipation of litigation" in that particular forum.
60
Consequently, it would not be a hard decision to find that a company
doing business in numerous states would have "minimum contacts"
with those states even if there were no physical presence of the com-
pany except by way of mail.61 In fact, the routine conducting of busi-
ness in and of itself establishes continuous contact with a particular
state that, under the rationale of International Shoe, translates into a
sufficient minimum contact conferring jurisdiction.
62
Non-business mail contacts, however, often fall into the "random,"
"fortuitous," and "attenuated," categorization of jurisdictional analy-
sis. 6 3 All mailings are not necessarily business in nature and the
cases in which a non-business letter is the alleged basis for jurisdic-
tion tend to be premised on defamation. 64 They often involve a letter
or letters being mailed into a forum state and causing some sort of
59. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222. See also Currie, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. at 540. States have
a continuous regulatory interest in various businesses as well as aspects of doing busi-
ness such as licensing, granting permits, taxation, and unemployment compensation.
60. See Zorn v. Fingerhut Corp., No. CIV A. 89-6558, 1989 WL 143839, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 22, 1989). In this case, a Minnesota resident sued a New Jersey corporation in
Pennsylvania for injuries sustained when using an exercise apparatus which had been
mailed to Minnesota. Zorn, 1989 WL 143839, at *1-2. In finding Pennsylvania retained
jurisdiction, the court stated "having shipped directly, by mail or otherwise, products
into the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to various mail-order customers, defendant
has purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Pennsylvania
involving the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at *2.
61. But see Faulkner v. Carowinds Amusement Park, 867 F. Supp. 419, 424 (S.D.
W. Va. 1994) (stating that "the plaintiff must engage in activities far more extensive
than mail solicitations accompanied by an occasional visit to the forum state by a group
representative.").
62. See also McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
63. But see Fallang v. Hickey, 532 N.E.2d 117 (Ohio 1988) in which a doctor mailed
a single letter into the State of Ohio allegedly defaming another doctor. The defendant
claimed that the contact with Ohio was "random [and] fortuitous." Fallang, 532 N.E.2d
at 119. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, did not agree and focused on the purposeful
nature of mailing the letter into the state relying on the analysis employed in Burger
King. Id. at 120. The court also noted that Ohio had the greatest interest in adjudicat-
ing the dispute because the injury occurred there. Id. at 119.
64. There are also non-defamation cases in which the plaintiff asserts that sporadic
mailing constitutes a minimum contact. For instance, in Witbeck v. Bill Cody's Ranch
Inn, 411 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. 1987), a Michigan resident sued in Michigan for injuries
sustained in Wyoming. The plaintiff alleged sufficient contact based on an advertise-
ment in a nationally distributed Triple AAA tour guide mailed to Michigan. Witbeck,
411 N.W.2d at 445. The court found insufficient contact with Michigan and held juris-
diction to be unconstitutional. Id. at 446.
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reputational damage. 65 In addressing the "fairness aspect" of requir-
ing a defendant to litigate in a particular forum, courts have balanced
the totality of circumstances which are, essentially, the totality of con-
tacts other than the mail or mailings themselves. 66 Such contacts
might be a defendant's traveling into the state, the size of the audi-
ence the letter reaches, phone calls made in conjunction with the mail-
ings, or perhaps offices situated in the forum state. Additionally, some
courts take into consideration the forum state's interest in litigating a
particular issue.
67
In some instances, the use of mails (such as mailing a defamatory
letter) is the central link upon which jurisdiction is asserted.68 In
other cases, use of the mails is peripheral to the focal point of the suit
and is just one factor the court must consider in assessing the overall
situation. 69 One letter, if business-oriented, may be enough to estab-
lish jurisdiction. 70 Likewise, one letter, if criminal in nature (such as
extortion, bribery, or threat) makes jurisdiction fair even if the perpe-
trator never setting foot in the jurisdiction.71 One letter, if tortious in
nature (such as an allegedly defamatory letter) is usually not enough
to make the assertion of jurisdiction fair, absent a defendant's other
contacts with the state.
72
The Internet, similar to the mails, has the same potential to be
singular in nature or of being much more widespread. Depending on
where or how a message is posted, its direction may be to a single
person or it might be received by millions around the world. 73 For a
65. See supra note 63.
66. See supra note 61.
67. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966). In Curtis, a
New York writer was sued in Alabama over disparaging remarks made about Missis-
sippi residents. Curtis, 360 F.2d at 345, 346. The court held Alabama had little interest
in the resolution of the issue. Id. at 347.
68. See Norris v. Oklahoma City Univ., No. 93-16647, 1994 WL 127175, at *2 (9th
Cir. Apr. 12, 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 738 (1995), in which the plaintiff claimed she
was defamed by letters sent with her law school transcripts into the State of California.
69. See Pilipauskas v. Yakel, 629 N.E.2d 733, 741 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994). In Pilipaus.
kas, an Illinois resident brought suit in Illinois for injuries received in Michigan.
Pilipauskas, 629 N.E.2d at 735. The allegation was that advertising mailed into Illinois
constituted sufficient minimum contacts. Id. at 737-40.
70. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221, 223.
71. See In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257, 265-66 (1890).
72. See, e.g., Burt v. Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 242, 244-45 (10th Cir. 1985) (bas-
ing jurisdiction on the effect of the defendant's conduct rather than the letters), vacated
on grounds of mootness, 475 U.S. 1063 (1986); Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039,
1050 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that one letter was insufficient to justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction); Zinz v. Evans & Mitchell Indus., 324 A.2d 140, 142-44 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974) (finding that one letter was insufficient to justify the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction). But see Fallang, 532 N.E.2d at 119-20.
73. See generally R. Timothy Muth, Old Doctrines on a New Frontier: Defamation
and Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 68 Wis. LAw. 10 (1995).
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non-business, non-criminal "projected presence" received by millions
internationally, there is no direct judicial precedent by which to analo-
gize or predict a jurisdictional determination.74 In analogizing the
use of the mails to the Internet, a comparable mail scenario might be
an individual mailing a defamatory letter to millions of people world-
wide with some of them reading it and some of them throwing it away.
A possible example of this is a magazine or newspaper publishing a
defamatory article and circulating this article nationally or interna-
tionally. This would give the mailing a "presence" in different loca-
tions at one time.
7 5
The Supreme Court has considered such a situation. In Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. ,76 the Court held that the defendant publisher
could be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in the United States when
there was a substantial circulation of the magazine throughout the
United States.77 In Keeton, the plaintiff was a resident of New York
who claimed that she was libeled in five issues of Hustler Magazine.7 8
The plaintiff sued Hustler, which was incorporated in Ohio and main-
tained its principal place of business in California.7 9 The suit was
originally brought in Ohio, but because the statute of limitations had
run, the plaintiff brought the suit in New Hampshire.80
The Supreme Court found that the national circulation of the
magazine was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on New Hampshire.8 '
The Court theorized that the dissemination of magazines was not
"random, isolated, or fortuitous," but was purposefully directed at the
forum state and inevitably had an effect there.82 The Court focused
on the magazine's circulation, which was continuous and deliberate,
and the fact that the magazine derived a profit from national sales.
This led the Court to conclude that New Hampshire could constitu-
tionally assert personal jurisdiction over New Hampshire.8 3
74. That is not to say there are not issues relating directly to the Internet and
whether those making Internet postings may be considered public figures in defamation
suits. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Note,
Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public Figure Doctrine and Defamation on Com-
puter Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461, 461 (1995).
75. See generally David J. Conner, Note, Cubby v. Compuserve, Defamation Law on
the Electronic Frontier, 2 GEO. MASON IND. L. Rzv. 227 (1993) (discussing message pres-
ence on bulletin boards).
76. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
77. Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
78. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 772 n.1.
81. Id. at 781.
82. Id. at 774.
83. Id. at 781.
1997] 1179
HeinOnline  -- 30 Creighton L. Rev. 1179 1996-1997
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
Similarly, in Calder v. Jones,s4 the Court held that personal juris-
diction over the writers and editors of a defamatory article was proper
when the focal point of, and the resulting harm from, the allegedly
libelous article was purposefully directed at the forum state of Califor-
nia.8 5 In Calder, the defendants were employees of the National En-
quirer whose place of business was Florida where the defendants
resided.8 6 The basis of the suit was a defamatory article impugning
the reputation of entertainer Shirley Jones.8 7 In finding California
an appropriate jurisdiction, the Court focused on the intentional acts
of the writers, stating that the writers knew that the article would
have a substantial effect on the plaintiff, they knew the article would
be circulated in the forum state, (California was their largest circula-
tion), and they knew that the article would cause considerable harm
there.88 Considering both Jones's emotional distress and harm to her
professional reputation, the Court determined that the majority of the
harm was suffered in California.8 9
Both Keeton and Calder, out of the nature of publication, involved
business contacts and substantial circulation. Given those factors, the
Court's leaning toward finding jurisdiction fair in those situations was
reasonable, even though Calder focused on the intentional projection
of harm into California. Similar circulation of Internet postings, even
if they are allegedly defamatory, do not require a financial motive and,
as a consequence, Keeton and Calder are not directly analogous nor
dispositive.
When attempting to assess just where Internet communications
fit in technology-wise, it is difficult to determine whether Internet
transmissions are more like mass-circulated literature (letters or
magazines) or like telephone calls. 90 On one hand, because Internet
communications must be read to have any meaning and are capable of
mass-circulation, they are like the paper medium. On the other hand,
84. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
85. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984). Calder was the President of the
Enquirer. Calder, 465 U.S. at 786.
86. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785-86.
87. Id. at 784.
88. Id. at 788-90. Purposeful direction has always been an essential criterion when
assessing the fairness of asserting jurisdiction over an individual. See St. Clair v.
Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148, 154 (W.D. Va. 1966).
89. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
90. See Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit
for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 258-59 (1995), for a discussion on whether defamatory In-
ternet postings are closer to libel or slander. See also It's In the Cards, Inc. v. Fus-
chetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "[Tihe messages [on the
bulletin board] are not done on a monthly, weekly, or daily basis, but are sporadic...
review denied, 537 N.W.2d 574 (Wis. 1995).
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because the mass-circulated paper medium (such as for-profit maga-
zine or mass advertisement) generally has a business connection, an
Internet bulletin board posting might be more analogous to a phone
call; one, perhaps, that is primarily social in nature.9 1
Unlike the mails, however, ordinary telephone calls do not gener-
ally have the potential of achieving a "presence" in many places at the
same time (except, perhaps, a conference call, which is still somewhat
limited in scope). The courts analysis in determining long arm juris-
diction in respect to telephone connections has been somewhat differ-
ent than courts analysis of the mails. A single, business-oriented
phone call is not enough to establish jurisdiction absent any other
business-related contacts. 92 Likewise, a defamatory call made into a
jurisdiction is not enough to establish jurisdiction absent other con-
tacts with the state.9 3 Overall, courts assessing the jurisdictional im-
plications of telephone calls appear to recognize that signals
transmitted electronically do not fall into the category defined by In-
ternational Shoe as constituting a "minimum contact." The use of the
telephone is recognized even less than use of the mails as being alone
able to constitute a continuous or deliberate contact with a forum
state that has the potential of deriving any "benefits and protections"
of that forum.
94
Whether analyzing jurisdictional implications of using the mails
or using the telephone, courts focus on the totality of the contacts, and
of what nature those contacts happen to be. Mass-circulation may not
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction unless related to business.95 Pur-
posefully directed harm may not be sufficient unless the harm is mass-
circulated and causes some tangible damage. 96 A similar formula
91. See Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer Bulletin
Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEo. L.J. 409, 418 (1992) and Note, Computer
Bulletin Board Systems and the Right of Reply: Redefining Defamation Liability for a
New Technology, 12 REV. LrrIG. 231, 232-33 (1992), for a discussion of the logistics of
leaving and viewing Internet messages.
92. See, e.g., Coating Engineers (Private) Ltd. v. Electric Motor Repair Co., 826 F.
Supp. 147, 149 (D. .Md. 1993) (finding that phone contacts and phone listing do not
amount to conducting business in Maryland); CDI Contractors, Inc. v. Goff Steel Erec-
tors, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Ark. 1990) (finding that phone and mail contacts were
insufficient to satisfy due process); Central Clearing, Inc. v. Omega Indus., Inc., 356
N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (stating three phone calls insufficient to satisfy due
process); TSE Supply Co. v. Cumberland Natural Gas Co., 648 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that one phone order and one letter of credit were insufficient con-
tacts to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
93. See Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. See also Dollar Say. Bank v.
First Sec. Bank, 746 F.2d 208, 209 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that wire money transfers did
not translate into purposeful availment).
95. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
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may be employed when assessing the jurisdictional implications of In-
ternet postings. Clearly, the Internet may be used for soliciting busi-
ness or for purposely defaming another individual; however, long-arm
jurisdiction should not be automatic because of circulation or damage
potential. As with the mails or telephone, courts should assess In-
ternet connections in relation to all factors that tie a user to a particu-
lar state. This would necessarily include a court's looking to the
purposeful nature of the conduct, the business orientation of the post-
ing, or any wide-reaching effects that are achieved by the posting.
INTERNET JURISDICTIONAL CASES
To date, there have been few cases involving jurisdictional issues
in conjunction with computer communications, and none addressing
long-arm jurisdiction based on a single, allegedly defamatory posting
done in the context of a social discussion on an Internet bulletin
board. 9 7 Several cases have alleged defamation occurring over the In-
ternet but jurisdiction was not an issue in any of the cases. 98 There
are two cases that seem to generate the most discussion on the topic of
jurisdiction over computerized transactions or postings. 9 9 Neither of
these cases relates to defamation occurring over the Internet, but
rather discuss the general jurisdictional implications of a computer
link being the connection between states. 10 0
In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc. ,1O1 the plain-
tiff was a travel agency having its database and billing office in Flor-
ida and providing travel reservation services to subscribers
nationally.10 2 The defendant in the case was a New York subscriber
doing business solely in New York leasing Pres-Kap terminals and
subscribing to the travel service.' 0 3 When the defendant stopped
97. Arguably the defamation cases involve a social discussion, but they have been
primarily related to business. See infra note 98.
98. See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Sup.
Dec. 11, 1995); It's In the Cards v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995);
Suarez Corp. Ind. v. Meeks, No. 267513 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. 1994).
99. See generally Note, Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.: Extending
the Reach of the Long-Arm Statute through the Internet? 13 J. MAR. J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 433 (1995).
100. See generally Comment, Automated Clearing House Growth in an International
Marketplace: The Increased Flexibility of Electronic Funds Transfer and Its Impact on
the Minimum Contacts Test, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 105 (1994), for a discussion on
how electronic fund transfer technology effects minimum contacts analysis.
101. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
102. Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1351 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
103. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1352.
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making payments, Pres-Kap sued for breach of lease and filed suit in
Florida.
1 0 4
In finding that Florida had no jurisdiction over the defendant, the
court stated that the computer contacts and billings mailed to Florida
were insufficient to confer jurisdiction on Florida. 10 5 The court com-
mented that a contrary result would have "far reaching implications"
by potentially subjecting all on-line users to jurisdiction in the state in
which the provider had only a billing office or database. 10 6 This, the
court stated, was beyond the expectations of the ordinary computer
user and offended "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice," especially in an age in which the ordinary computer user did not
even know where a particular database was located. 107
Some courts have reached contrary results. In Plus System, Inc.
v. New England Network, Inc. ,108 the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado held that Colorado could assert jurisdiction
over a Connecticut "branch" of an Automated Teller Machine (ATM)
system - a system that had a network connection with the forum state
of Colorado. 10 9 In reaching its decision, the court emphasized the na-
tional scope of the ATM system, continuous phone contacts and the
business-oriented contacts the defendant had with the forum state.
1 10
The court balanced all factors in determining the Connecticut based
company "purposely availed itself" of Colorado."' Also significant in
the court's decision was the fact that the parties had entered into a
contract which declared Colorado law would apply should there be a
dispute. 112
In California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc.,113 the
court was faced with a situation perhaps most directly analogous to
defamation Internet cases. California Software involved litigation be-
tween two computer software companies, one of which alleged the
other interfered with its ability to license and market a software prod-
uct. 1 4 Among the causes of action alleged was libel occurring over
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1353.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
109. Plus System, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111, 118-19 (D.
Colo. 1992). Monthly payments were also made to an office in Colorado. Plus System,
804 F. Supp. at 118.
110. Plus System, 804 F. Supp. at 118-19.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 118.
113. 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
114. California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1358
(C.D. Cal. 1986).
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the Internet. 1 15 The plaintiff, a California corporation, alleged that a
corporate officer of the defendant, a Nevada corporation doing busi-
ness in Vermont, posted defamatory remarks over an Internet bulletin
board called the "Computer Reliability Forum."116 The Computer Re-
liability Forum was operated by the defendants and the information
on the bulletin board was disseminated nationally.1 17 Among the re-
marks made on the bulletin board were representations of the defend-
ant claiming there was a legal dispute over the plaintiffs software
license. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's postings influenced
consumers not to buy the product from the plaintiff.1 1s
In finding jurisdiction over the defendant based on the defama-
tory Internet postings, the court commented, that the "[Diefendants
made tortious statements which, though directed at third persons
outside California, were expressly calculated to cause injury in Cali-
fornia."1 19 The court focused on the intentional nature of the defend-
ant's actions and stated that the manipulation of third persons caused
the plaintiff to be prevented from consummating a business transac-
tion in California. The defendants, consequently, should have antici-
pated "answering for the veracity of their statements" in California. 1
20
Although Pres-Kap, Plus System, and California Software seem to
reach inconsistent results, none of the courts applied a jurisdictional
balancing test differently than any other court contemplating a tangi-
ble medium of communication or physical presence in a state.
Although the national scope of computer communications was consid-
ered as a factor in the balance by all of the courts, no court went so far
as to hold that such scope was, or should be, the determinative factor
in jurisdictional decisions. In fact, in finding jurisdiction "fundamen-
tally unfair," the court in Pres-Kap focused on the tack of any other
contact other than computer contact in their decision despite the busi-
ness relationship that existed between the parties. 12 1 Although the
outcome of Plus System is different, the analysis is similar to Pres-
Kap. The Plus System court focused on the quality and quantity of
contacts - mailings, network connection, personal visits, national
scope of the business, site of the contract signing, and choice of law
provision. 122 Similarly, the court in California Software balanced the
115. California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1358.
116. Id.
117. Id. It was established that the message was received in Washington, New
York, and Canada. Id.
118. California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
119. Id. at 1361.
120. Id. at 1362.
121. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
1184 [Vol. 30
HeinOnline  -- 30 Creighton L. Rev. 1184 1996-1997
INTERNET JURISDICTION
quality and quantity of contacts. 12 3 This included the interference the
defendant caused to Plaintiffs business relationships and the knowl-
edge that the postings were certain to cause effect in California.
Although the California Software court focused on the broad dissemi-
nation of information provided on the computer bulletin board, this
contact was only significant as it related to how the California com-
pany was economically disadvantaged. In addition, the defendants
had also engaged in "purposeful direction" by sending letters into Cali-
fornia that discouraged customers from buying Plaintiffs product.
Subjecting Internet users to in personam jurisdiction in distant
forums based on bulletin board participation would be erroneous with-
out balancing other traditional factors that would link an individual to
a particular state. There have been clear jurisdictional lines drawn in
terms of business versus non-business activities; thus, it would be rea-
sonable for states to extend jurisdiction over Internet users who en-
gage in business activities on the computer. 124 Similarly, it would not
be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over an individual who uses the
Internet to engage in an international or national criminal scheme. 1
2 5
However, both of those categories of individuals would be subject to
jurisdiction in a multitude of states without there having been an In-
ternet connection. The Internet connection alone should not be the
sole basis of a state's asserting jurisdiction. Additionally, the Internet
connection should not be the primary basis for asserting jurisdiction
absent more traditional links to a particular forum in the way of busi-
ness or other continuous activity within the state. Moreover, while
the purposeful direction of a defamatory comment has been one of the
bases for asserting the constitutionality of long arm jurisdiction, such
purposeful direction without more has generally been regarded as an
insufficient contact to make jurisdiction "fundamentally fair."12 6 Such
should be the same analysis applied to singular Internet postings.
123. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Scherman v. Kansas City Aviation Center, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-2211-
GTV, 1993 WL 191369 (D. Kan., May 14, 1993). In Scherman, the court found that
Kansas had jurisdiction over Georgia corporations based on Internet posting for sale of
a plane received in Kansas. The court stated that "the advertising of the... aircraft in
the database sent into Kansas, when combined with a contract entered into... with a
Kansas resident to be performed in part in Kansas, provides the minimum contacts
necessary." Scherman, 1993 WL 191369, at *5.
125. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 74 (1996) for an example of a prosecution involving the dissemination of pornogra-
phy over the Internet. In Thomas, the defendants were California residents prosecuted
in Tennessee. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705. Because the material was received in Tennes-
see, Tennessee was found to be the proper venue. Id. at 709-10. This is not to be con-
fused with jurisdiction. Because the defendants were prosecuted for violation of a
federal statute, jurisdiction in the federal courts was appropriate and there was no need
for "long-arm" analysis.
126. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the mandate of International Shoe includes a rea-
sonable anticipation of litigation. Despite the fact that Internet post-
ings, even if defamatory, may be wide in scope, it does not mean that
computer users are aware of where their postings might be read or
that they are purposefully directing "harm" into a particular state.
Such computer users could not reasonably anticipate litigating in a
state in which they might not have known a posting was made. Argu-
ing that Internet users are highly educated or should somehow be
aware of the legal implications of their posting presupposes too much
legal sophistication for these individuals aggregately. In fact, com-
puter usage is so simplistic and prevalent that it is not uncommon to
find elementary-age children adept at using the Internet.1 27 It would
be illogical to assume that school-age children would understand the
legal repercussions of their postings, even if provided with an explicit
warning concerning the consequences of their actions, such as the
warning posted by the Attorney General of Minnesota.'12
Taken to an extreme, predicating jurisdiction solely or primarily
on a computer link would potentially subject various small businesses,
or, in a not too extreme interpretation, every attorney in the United
States, to jurisdiction in all fifty states. The use of Lexis, Westlaw,
Internet research sites, e-mail, and even web site advertising could
arguably suggest continuous and systematic business contacts on
which to base not just specific jurisdiction, but perhaps even general
jurisdiction. 129 As a result of this "virtual" presence everywhere in
the nation, there would be immense potential for forum-shopping or
even harassment through the judicial system simply because of the
existence of resources that are available via technological
developments. 130
127. See generally Judy Pennington, Volunteers in the Schools Invest in the Future,
BATON ROUGE ADvoc., May 7, 1996, at 6 (special section); James J. Rodriguez, Forming
a Digital Community, School Kids Link Up with Seniors on Line, L.A. DAMY NEws, Feb.
3, 1996, at SC1.
128. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
129. See generally Mac Norton, Speedtraps, Roadblocks, and Sobriety Checks on the
Information Superhighway, 30 Aam LAw. 7 (1996).
130. See generally Comment, Networking in Cyberspace: Electronic Defamation and
the Potential for International Forum Shopping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 527 (1995).
In fact, an entire field of legal expertise could be dedicated to determining in which state
is the most favorable law, potential for damages, or where a particular statute of limita-
tion has not run. Because of the lack of geographical boundaries of the Internet, a defa-
mation suit could conceivably be brought in a jurisdiction where the statute of
limitations has not run while the plaintiff attempts to elect having the court apply the
law of yet another state having some link to the litigation via the Internet. See gener-
ally Comment, Let the Chips Fall Where They May: Choice of Law in Computer Bulletin
Board Defamation Cases, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1045 (1993) and Harold L. Korn, The
Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 772 (1983) for a further dis-
cussion of problems relating to choice of law.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the Internet warning of the Minnesota Attorney General
and the technological developments that allow virtual presence
through Internet connections, computer links do not warrant disre-
garding existing jurisdictional standards. The balancing tests articu-
lated by International Shoe and its Supreme Court progeny have
survived and been suitable in making jurisdictional determinations
regardless of communications improvements. The Internet, although
having a vaster scope of communication potential, is simply another
technological development that does not warrant unique legal treat-
ment nor a re-evaluation of well-established jurisdictional principles
that predicate jurisdiction on fundamental fairness and more tangible
contacts than electronic transmissions.
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